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INTRODUCTION

In the great dance of life, lawyers feign to play the supporting
role of the troubadour. It is their professional responsibility to play
and to sing the music by which people negotiate their way through
life; it is a humble, but essential, calling. In earlier times, people were
not able to compose their own legal tunes nor were they able to
indulge in jurismusical criticism. Indeed, they had no choice but to
dance to the favored choruses of those who called the legal minstrels'
tune. But as people lose the sense that law is the imperfect echo of a
heavenly choirmaster or the approximate aria of an enlightened Reason, troubling questions are being asked. In an era of purported democratic sensibilities and aspirations, the origins and legitimacy of law's
lyric and rhythm are no longer accepted nor assumed; the relation
between "Law's Song," its legal singers, and the identity of its
composer increasingly are being questioned. In particular, there is a
growing suspicion that lawyers are the singers and the composers of
"Law's Song." As a critical and Yeatsian-inspired musicologist might
put it, "How can we know the song from the singer?" '
Despite common understandings about the political character of
law, there remains a core belief that law retains an essential degree of
* Allan C. Hutchinson is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto, Canada. The author wishes to thank Leslie Green, Michael Trebilcock,

Corinne Doan, Richard Epstein, and Carole Trussler for their comments and assistance in
completing this essay.
1. See Yeats, Among School Children, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM BUTLER
YEATS 212 (1940) ("0 body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,/ How can we know the
dancer from the dance?"). See also A. LINDOP, THE SINGER NOT THE SONG (1953).
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hermeneutical autonomy. Legal interpretation can and should be performed in a manner that distinguishes it from the more open-ended
ideological debates that are the stuff of political struggle. The halcyon
days of an unself-conscious formalism, characterized by an apparent
reliance on a mechanical algorithm or logical parthogenesis, are long
gone. Nevertheless, there still remains a tenacious commitment and
aspiration to "bounded objectivity" 2 -the idea that there is a difference between "Law's Song" and those lawyers who happen to be singing it at a particular time. When lawyers or judges hold forth on what
the law is, it is claimed that they are not singing their own songs, but
rather that they are mouthing the words of the Law. Although the
music of the Law is neither disembodied nor alien, and although
judges are not perceived to be "incapable of moderating either its
force or rigour,"' 3 "Law's Song" is still treated as much more than the
accumulated babble of lawyers' competing voices over time. It is
more of an abiding symphony than an ephemeral cacophony.
Borne and practiced in politics, the idea is that the voice of the
Law somehow manages to retain a distinct accent and idiom that
addresses politics, but is not entirely spoken for by politics. Just as
"Law's Song" is not optional, and can be coercively imposed, the
independence and impartiality of its formal songsters are paramount:
"[their] authority and immunity depend upon the assumption that
[they] speak with the mouth of others." 4 Similarly, legal reasoning is
both depicted and received as a special mode of interpretive activity
that exists within and because of ideological conflict, but that is distinguishable in some nontrivial way from other, more overtly ideological
modes of interpretive activity. Legal reasoning then is something
more than simply what lawyers happen to say or sing. Indeed, if it
was only that, it would warrant neither greater nor lesser respect and
deference than that which ideologues, steelworkers, and accountants
say or sing.
In this essay, I challenge both the traditional portrayal of the
lawyer's role and its legitimacy. In order to provide a convincing justification for the crucial distinction between law and lawyers, it must
be shown that the doctrinal materials that comprise the law cannot
offer determinate guidance in the resolution of most legal cases. In a
2. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34
STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
3. See C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 159 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) ("[T]he
national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere
passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour."). See also Osborn v. United
States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
4. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1938).
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political and legal system that claims to be democratic, such impersonal constraints on the important activities of unelected officials is
vital to that system's continued legitimacy and appeal. This need is
particularly acute in the area of constitutional adjudication. By
deploying a deconstructive variant of the "indeterminacy critique," I
show that a demonstration of determinacy cannot be made and that,
consequently, the law is irredeemably indeterminate. In other words,
I argue that legal interpretation is thoroughly political because its performance and product can never be detached from the identities and
interests of the interpreters. In short, the prestige and authority of
lawyers is unfounded both in political theory and in political practice.
Furthermore, an explanation of the law's indeterminacy does not
hasten the demise of democracy, as many traditional writers seem to
predict. This is merely a scare-tactic designed to underwrite and warrant their own tenuous assertion of power. The indeterminacy critique
is fatal to the legitimacy of the current adjudicative enterprise, but it
is not damaging to democracy. Although indeterminacy jeopardizes
any mode of objective decisionmaking, it does offer an understanding
of how ordinary citizens can and must be entrusted with increased
responsibility and authority in the name of democratic empowerment.
In order to focus this Essay's challenge and critique, I concentrate on
some recent writings by Richard Posner that, in their efforts to present a workable theory and application of legal interpretation, are
emblematic of the false aspirations and real shortcomings of contemporary jurisprudence.
II.

THE POSNERIAN POSTURE

Doctrinal analysis remains the primary work of the law student,
professor, practitioner, and judge. The task of the lawyer is portrayed
as similar to that of the warehouseperson. Law comprises a great
storehouse of rules, principles, and similar normative goods that are
individually catalogued and systematically shelved. During the
course of business, goods shift in and out of the warehouse in response
to the quantity and quality of legal trade. Apart from keeping the
detailed inventory, these doctrinal analysts must ensure that incoming
norms are screened and sorted so that the existing stock is not contaminated by unsuitable or errant goods. At any time, however,
experienced scholars can point to a principle or set of rules that is
appropriate for resolving a particular litigated dispute. In addition,
the doctrinal analysts must be able to perform a thorough stock-taking and present a workable account of the totality of normative goods
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housed. An exhaustive survey is precluded, however, by the openended character of such goods and the brisk nature of legal trade.
It is not that doctrinal analysts necessarily deny that law's warehouse has an underlying prescriptive theme or grander normative
unity. Instead, they do not consider elucidation of this theme or normative unity to be part of their job description. Instead, they feel that
they already have ample work cut out for themselves in conquering
the technical details that are a part of their own chosen alcove of the
doctrinal warehouse. There is nothing necessarily inconsistent about
doctrinal analysts accepting that economics or philosophy might be
valuable to a broader understanding of their warehousing craft, or to
an improved organization of the warehouse in general. Rather, they
simply do not think that it is their responsibility to pursue such
inquiries; in fact, some die-hards go so far as to insist that such digressions make a worse lawyer.5 Indeed, under the traditional division of
jurisprudential labor, this pursuit falls squarely within the duties of
legal theorists-to provide a larger and more integrative view of law,
to evaluate its performance, and to fathom its relation to other
disciplines.
This contemporary project takes many diverse shapes and sizes.
Many turn to the humanities for inspiration and find recent writings
in political and moral philosophy to be precisely what the jurisprudential doctor ordered.6 Some prefer the social sciences and find
7
intellectual succor in the models of the economists or sociologists.

Others resort to the study of language itself and take comfort in its
hermeneutic possibilities.8 Still others attempt to combine the
insights of different disciplines.' In raiding these other disciplines,
however, legal theorists maintain an often-neglected, but shared,
informing ambition: they seek to supplement the doctrinal analysts'
understanding of the law by revealing the internal rationality or normative underpinnings of the law. They do not forsake the doctrinal
analysts, but inform their craft with a higher purpose and critical
edge.' 0 Thus, although some doctrinal analysts strive to reveal the
5. See Parker, Legal Scholarship and Legal Education, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 653
(1985).
6. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
7. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
8. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
9. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 2.
10. For instance, the writings of Charles Fried have been enriched with the teachings of
moral philosophy. Fried acknowledges an intimate and crucial relation between law and
morality, insisting that "law is a moral science and that judges, in determining the law, decide
as moral agents." See Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal
History, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335, 336 (1980). Similarly, his more focused study of contract law

1989]

DEMOCRACY AND DETERMINACY

law's own internal luminescence, others seek to -light up law with an
external battery of floodlights that draw their energy from a nonlegal
source. Both strategies are attendant with great risk. Not only do
they chance the result that the light will be so searingly bright that its
distortions will blind onlookers to much that is important in law, but
also that the light will be mistaken for that which is to be illuminated.
In short, the law's phosphorescence amounts to little more than the
reflected radiance of the theorists' own normative lights. I I
In three recent essays, 12 Richard Posner sets out to demonstrate
that law is no longer an autonomous discipline. Appointing himself
the champion of interdisciplinary study, he chastises those law professors who resist its call to academic arms and, instead, cling to an
anachronistic understanding of law. For Posner, the last quarter of a
century has evinced a decline in lawyers' faith that law is and should
be an autonomous discipline in the sense that "the only essential preparation for a legal scholar was the knowledge of what was in [authoritative legal texts-judicial and administrative opinions, statutes, and
rules] and the power of logical discrimination and argumentation that
came from close and critical study of them."' 3 Although the work of
the doctrinal analyst rightly will remain at the core of legal education
and practice, the work of the modern Posnerian jurist must be
informed by both the insights and the methods of other disciplines.
Like an incongruous combination of the gallant Dutch boy and the
vainglorious Canute, "conventionalists" hope to stem the flood of
interdisciplinary study only through dint of their own legal presence
and craft. 14 In contrast, Posner believes that only when the dry earth
of legal learning is irrigated by interdisciplinary study will it become
the rich loam of social justice: to believe otherwise is to risk legal
culture being blown away by the crass winds of political history.
Although Posner chooses to look to the discipline of economics
is devoted to a defense of the "promise principle" as the moral basis of contract doctrine. See
C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). On the other hand, Anthony Kronman has drawn
freely on the liberal branch of political philosophy to advance the traditional understanding of
contract law. See Kronman, ContractLaw and The State of Nature, I J. L. ECON. & ORG. 5
(1985); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
11. For an extended critique of this difficulty, see Hutchinson, That's Just The Way It Is:
Langille on Law, 34 McGILL L.J. 145 (1989); Hutchinson, The Importance of Not Being
Ernest, 34 McGILL L.J. 234 (1989).
12. See Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U.
TOR. L.J. 333 (1987) [hereinafter Conventionalism]; Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987) [hereinafter Decline];
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988) [hereinafter
Skepticism].
13. Decline, supra note 12, at 763.
14. See Conventionalism, supra note 12, at 338-39.
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for doctrinal guidance, he is engaged in the same apologetic enterprise
as the conventionalists whom he scorns. 5 His project operates at a
different level of generality than the conventionalists', but it has the
same scope and ambition. Both the conventionalists and the interdisciplinarians recognize the debilitating force of the realist critique. At
the same time, however, they accept that the ostrich-like response of
doctrinal analysts has been inadequate. Like the conventionalists,
Posner offers a more abstract and broader variant of traditional scholarship; doctrinal analysis is simply its limiting mode. Indeed, legal
theorists of a conventionalist or interdisciplinary persuasion are the
apologetic twins to their unreflective doctrinal siblings. The family of
traditionalists desire to salvage legal study and practice from the deep,
dark void of Critical Legal Studies in which "law is politics." The
disagreement is not a simple dispute of left-right politics in the
customary sense; the matter goes much deeper. The profound methodological discontinuity between the traditionalists and the Critics
speaks to the fact that debates about legal epistemology are the con16
tinuation of ideological warfare by other, more esoteric, means.
Although Posner encourages a skeptical attitude towards law
and legal reasoning, he does not deny that there are legal rules, nor
more importantly, does he deny that judges can and should follow
them.'7 Although there is a lack of any distinctive method of legal
reasoning, for Posner this is more an inconvenient irritation than a
debilitating omission. For Posner, judges must exercise discretion in
deciding difficult cases, although most legal questions "are not difficult . . . [and] can be answered syllogistically."'" In order to overcome this shortcoming in recalcitrant cases, Posner maintains that a
solution for the law's marginal indeterminacy can be found in the economic analysis of law, which is "the closest thing to formal logic in
15. This paper is very North American in focus and concern. It does not claim to reflect
or deal with the neo-positivism of much of the traditional jurisprudential thought in the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) and J. RAz, THE CONCEPT
OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970). Such work is more interested in establishing the formal criteria
for legal validity than in justifying the legitimacy of doctrinal analysis; it is about conceptual
soundness, not normative worth. A belief in law's immanent rationality or social justice is not
required. See L. GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 63-121 (1988).
16. See Hutchinson, Part of An Essay on Power and Interpretation (With Suggestions on
How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 861-66 (1985).
17. Skepticism, supra note 12, at 834, 862. See also Posner, The Present Situation in Legal

Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1115 (1981) ("Many economic analysts of law, such as myself,
are very interested in cases, and when we use economics to reconcile and distinguish cases, we
are carrying on the tradition of the doctrinal analysts."). Of course, I do not claim that rules
do not exist. I do not think, however, that they exist or operate in the way Posner and others
do. See infra pp. 564-67.

18. Skepticism, supra note 12, at 890.
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law ... [and may be] properly regarded as a school of legal formalism."' 9 Consequently, the latent determinacy of the law can be excavated and exhibited by interdisciplinary study. Nevertheless, although
economic analysis is touted by Posner as the salvation of the common
law and its indeterminacy, he does not believe that law is economic
nor that economics is law; each has a separate existence and provenance. Thus, economic analysis is a way of understanding law, but it
is not synonymous with law.
Although this characterization of law as an autonomous entityan entity whose hidden determinacy can be illuminated by economic
analysis-is a constant theme in Posner's work, it is especially evident
in his very recent monograph on tort law. This monograph's major
objective is to persuade the reader that Anglo-American tort law is
best understood and explained as an institutional effort to promote the
efficient allocation of resources, in the sense of the optimal reduction
of accident damages and avoidance costs. Posner is at pains to point
out that his claim possesses the status of positive analysis, rather than
the status of normative prescription. Indeed, it is not necessary to
believe in the moral worth of "wealth maximization" to accept that it
might provide the most cogent description of tort law in terms of
coherence and unity. Posner, in fact, concedes that significant areas
of the common law, such as comparative negligence and the defense
of custom, do not conform to this economic logic: these are the product of other generative forces. 20 In short, his whole argument and
analysis is based firmly on the belief that the law thrives, develops,
and changes independently of his economic model. Thus, his work
"accepts the existence, validity and importance of legal doctrine,
although it seeks to explain it in economic terms."21
The disagreement between Posner and the conventionalists therefore is a false fight and nothing more than an in-house struggle. Posner, in fact, is deeply committed to the traditional ideal-that "Law's
Song" is more than the preferred jingle of extant lawyers. I will
demonstrate this by discussing his view of the judge's appropriate and
legitimate role. Moreover, although Posner's analysis is not dissimilar
to the conventionalists, his approach is more different from that of the
19. Id. at 834-35. See also, Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 185 (1986)
("The modem exemplar of formalism in the common law is the positive economic analysis of
the law.").
20. Skepticism, supra note 12, at 835-36.
21. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 8 (1987). I
deal later with the imagined and defended separation of positive analysis and normative
prescription. See infra pp. 555-56.
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Critics than he cares to think. The conventionalist and the interdisciplinarians work the same autonomist street; they simply operate on
different sides of this traditional thoroughfare. In contrast, the Critics
claim that the legal roadway runs all over the ideological map and
that, in reality, the highways and byways represent favored political
routes. In the remainder of this Essay, I complete and push through
on the .skeptical stance-"astringent, irreverent, unsentimental, nononsense" 22- that Posner and his fellow autonomists embrace, only
so that they can smother it better. To illustrate the practical bite of
the critique, I use the case of Miller v. Jackson 23 as a focus. Finally, I
suggest a democratic response to the incorrigibility of indeterminacy.
III.

THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

The replacement of black-letter law with black-letter theory
should not come as a surprise. Contemporary legal theory is a more
sophisticated continuation of the traditional search for Coke's "artificial reason and judgment of law." 24 The Realist critique of the 1920's
and 1930's was, at best, only an interlude in the long-running drama
of legal formalism. Posner's suggestion that the Realist challenge has
been defeated is wishful thinking on his part. His assessment that it
has been "absorbed" by traditional scholarship, however, is nearer the
mark.25 At its height, Realism toppled the regnant rule-formalism in
order to create a better path to a full political realization of the formalist ideal. Ideologically and practically wedded to the reform program of New Deal liberalism, the Realists effected a pragmatic shift of
institutional focus, rather than a thorough rejection of formalism:
they sought to replace judge-dominated legal science with bureaucracy-wielded policy science. As such, Realists' attacks were never
intended to amount to more than a palace revolution. Straining the
truly radical insights and implications of the Realist critique through
a traditional sieve, contemporary scholars have served up a thin gruel
of neo-formalism.
Although any faith in a crude, jurisprudential algorithm has been
largely abandoned, there is still a fervent commitment and aspiration
to the possibility of resisting the radical claim that "law is politics."
Interdisciplinary study is not necessarily more liberating nor less narrowing; the shift from ratio decidendi to Pareto optimality is of dubious merit. Posner and his ilk remain the true heirs of Coke. As if
22.
23.
24.
25.

Skepticism, supra note 12, at 829.
1977 Q.B. 966 (C.A.).
See Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1607).
See Conventionalism, supra note 12, at 335; Decline, supra note 12, at 761.
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responding to a latter-day James I, Ronald Dworkini summarizes the
modern stance: "law ... is deeply and thoroughly political ... [b]ut
not a matter of personal or partisan politics."2 6 The task of scholars
is to uncover the immanent rationality that runs deep within the common law. The role of interdisciplinary study is neither to supplant
legal reasoning nor to provide a substitute for legal wisdom, but
instead to locate and understand them better. In delving into the foreign fields of other scholarly disciplines, the hope remains constant.
There is no desire to open up or turn over the legal project to the
subversive messages of some of those toiling in the anthropological or
sociological soil of radical study. The objective of this extra-legal
program of legal theory,
adventure is to complete the autonomists' 27
success.
its
or
validity
its
undermine
to
not
The force of this commitment to understanding law and its study
as autonomous is revealed in the literature on adjudication. The primary and self-imposed task of legal theorists is to explain and suggest
how judges can make the law responsive to changing social demands
and, at the same time, retain democratic legitimacy. How can judges
engage in politics in a distinctly "legal" manner? The realization that,
without an organizing and informing political vision, legal reasoning
is reduced to a desultory game of catch-as-catch-can is part of the
received conventional wisdom. Legal theorists recognize that the
larger questions of political justice must be addressed by any serious
account of legal development, and that adjudication is quintessentially
political both in performance and product. They insist that legal doctrine contains an immanent political rationality or vision of social justice that renders judicial practice coherent and legitimate. They have
no truck with the claim that judge-made law is an ideological enterprise. By adhering to this intrinsic ideal, it is contended that judges
can avoid engaging in the more open-ended exchanges of ideological
debate and therefore retain their vaunted democratic independence.
Posner's views and arguments on the judicial role are very much
in line with this traditional thinking. His work is fueled by an implacable desire to resist the disturbing charge that law is "politics." In
his book entitled The Federal Courts,2 8 Posner adumbrates a proposed
model of judicial behavior. Although the details of this proposal need
not be pursued, its general shape and substance are revealing. Posner
accepts that a judge has vast discretion and that "the irresponsible
26. R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985).
27. For further discussion of this intellectual history, see A. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON
THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 23-30
28. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).

(1988).
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judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires." 29
He cautions, however, against engaging in result- oriented, idiosyncratic, or partisan decisionmaking; it is only reprobate judges who
indulge their political preference too freely. Apart from such qualities
as self-discipline, logical analysis, common sense, and fair-mindedness, Posner advises an informed deference to "values that are widely,
though usually they will not be universally, held."" ° Whereas the
doctrinal analyst struggles to fit the appropriate rule to the facts in a
hard case, the theoretically informed judge is able to point to a suitable value or set of values.
In defending this depiction of the judicial function, Posner contrasts it with examples of judicial action and theorizing that do not
meet the demands of democratic legitimacy. He is particularly harsh
on Chief Justice Warren's practice and conception of adjudication. In
Posner's view, activism that comprises the brazen elevation of personal ethical imperatives to the status of a natural law of the Constitution leads to a performance of the judicial craft that is "ever more
partisan and parochial, lawless, and finally reckless." 3 By way of
underlining the illegitimacy of this approach, Posner indicates how
such a free-wheeling attitude easily can be taken advantage of by
those, like Mark Tushnet, who want to read the Constitution in line
with their favored political stance. 2 Like the conventionalist, it is
"the horror of indeterminacy and of the collapse of law into politics"3 3 that galvanizes Posner's project of autonomist scholarship.
Insofar as he does not act as an unbridled economist when he practices legal theory, it is surely the case that Posner does not think of
himself-whatever he actually does-as a law-and-economist at large
when he fulfills the role of judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Indeed, he maintains that such an
attempt would be "quite silly and futile,"'3 4 for it would undermine
judges' standing among their peers and be counter-productive.
One of the major problems with Posner's arguments is that, in
29. Id. at 287.
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id. at 214-15.
32. Id. at 218-19. See Tushnet, Following The Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783 (1983) (arguing that
"[c]onstitutional theory is essentially a concomitant of liberalism."); Tushnet, The Dilemmas
of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).
33. Conventionalism, supra note 12, at 340.
34. See Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REV. L. &

Ecs. 131 (1984). For a fascinating analysis of the extent to which there is a link between Judge
Posner and Professor Posner, see Culp, Judex Economics, 50(4), L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95

(1987).
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regard to his conventionalist foes, the arguments prove too little. The
resort to conventional morality or generally-held values is so indeterminate and manipulable that it can support a host of conflicting interpretations; consensus evaporates in those very instances of controversy when consensus is needed most. Indeed, the resort to such
allegedly consensual norms is the standard move of almost all contemporary legal theorists. 3 Although there is disagreement over the
nature of the raw materials from which warehoused values are to be
derived or manufactured and the ability of judges to fulfill their storekeeping duties effectively, theorists from Fried through Kronman to
Dworkin make similar methodological moves to defend their preferred notion of legitimate judicial reasoning. Thus, in order to give
his own ideas a modicum of epistemological respectability, Posner
must extend the same methodological courtesy to other competing
theories. In doing so, however, he undercuts the claim of his theory
to any particular priority either in explanatory or in normative terms.
Moreover, he robs it of any critical bite. Although Posner can validly
claim that "economic efficiency" offers a plausible account of legal
doctrine, he cannot assert that it possesses exclusive authority.
On the other hand, although Posner's attempt to ground his own
theory of responsible adjudication proves too little in terms of the
conventionalists' position, the attempt proves too much to provide an
effective response to the Critics' claims. Posner's apparent need to
consult the indistinct lights of an elusive, conventional morality
introduces a debilitating indeterminacy to his theoretical proposals.
In short, although Posner attempts to distinguish himself from the
conventionalists and the Critics, he succeeds in doing neither. The
Posnerian niche of legal theory is a nonexistent place between a rock
and a hard place. Rather than demonstrate that adjudication is a
determinate exercise, his arguments actually manage to support the
claim that "law is politics" and place him in the derided ranks of
"facile skepticism" and "left-wing nihilism."' 36 It is to the Critics'
arguments that I now turn.
IV.

LAW-AS-POLITICS

In an important sense, the disclosure that the rivalry between
Posner and the conventionalists is a contrived family-feud among the
autonomists is secondary to a more significant undertaking.
35. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
36. Conventionalism, supra note 12, at 353; Decline, supra note 12, at 766; and Skepticism,
supra note 12, at 889.
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Throughout, the main thrust of this Essay is to challenge and reject
the treasured distinction between law and politics. In its place, I offer
a different answer to the question of what is the relationship between
law and politics. By "politics," I do not mean simply conflicts over
the exercise and control of government power; this is only a subspecies of a larger genus. Rather, I use the term to refer to the actual or
latent conflicts over all the terms and conditions-social, economic,
institutional, passionate, or whatever-of our collective and individual lives."1 In addition, by "law," I do not mean all phenomena that
can be considered legal; my focus is more restricted. Although I consider law to be both an analytical category and a practical activity, my
inquiry is directed to the work of courts and lawyers, regardless of
whether they are dealing with the common law, statutes, or constitutional norms. This Essay makes no claims about the work of legislatures or constitutional conferences. Accordingly, my concern is with
the relation between the larger world of politics and the smaller
sphere of doctrinal development, especially in the development of the
common law.
Without a workable and convincing separation of law and politics, the legitimacy and prestige of courts and legal doctrine is undermined. In defending this crucial distinction, however, it is important
to understand what claims are and are not being made; the nature of
the distinction and its modern articulation are of a very particular
kind. As the writings of Posner and his conventionalist colleagues
demonstrate, the reality that law and lawyering has a substantial
political component is not denied. Indeed, it is a matter of trite learning, not only among legal theorists, but also within the more general
legal community. All lawyers concede that legal activity, whether it
pertains to legislation, litigation, or law-enforcement, arises in broadly
political circumstances, and that it has some political consequences.
In short, law is widely treated as a major player in the game of life.
Notwithstanding this relationship, the law-and-politics critique
assumes that there exists a method of thinking about law and politics
as independent and separable entities that is both possible and desirable. Not only must it satisfy the constraints of immanent or transcendent rationality, but it must also meet the demands of political justice.
Although I do not think that such an achievement is attainable, it
suffices to say that this immaculate position has not been attained to
date. The idea that the many different judges in many different places
might all be operating unknowingly under the influence of one "invisible hand" or "mind" is a coincidence that stretches the bounds of
37. See R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 10 (1987).
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credulity to the breaking point. The idea that this unifying mentality
happens to be the same as the theorists who make this discovery is
surely too much even for the most credulous among the academic
establishment. Consequently, although our existence in the law
school and the legal community at large may demand a focus on legal
matters, it does not follow that law and lawyering must be treated as a
distinct manner of thinking and acting. Because legal theorists deal
with what lawyers do, it does not mean that they must elevate it to a
privileged category of human activity with a special epistemological
and ontological status. Although federal parliamentarians/congresspersons are not provincial/state representatives, it does not follow
from this fact that their basic identity as politicians is different in any
normative or critical sense.
At a general level, law and politics interact and interpenetrate in
manifold and mutually generative ways. Law is not only a political
artifact of the first order, it is also a primary artificer of its political
context. Legal interpretation is a thoroughly political phenomenon
and activity. The life of the law is more than logic and less than our
total experience. 8 Of course, this does not mean that, because law
and politics are fully implicated in one another, they replicate each
other in a simple or undistorted fashion. Rather, this implies that
there is no form of social life "out there" independent of the law that
constitutes and structures it. Nor is there any law "out there" that is
independent of the society that generates and defines itself through
that law.3 9
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to describe a state of
affairs without drawing on the lexical imagery of legal relations. As a
white man, father, husband, worker, property owner, etc., my life is
saturated with and organized around different legal ideas. To dismiss
them as fictions, as some tend to do,' is wrong. Although law works
to impoverish the richness of my life by reducing it merely to legal
relations, it does play a significant role in formulating my own selfimage and derivative patterns of consistent behavior. The act of
representing the world to which law applies is already thoroughly
informed and constituted by the forms and structures of legal thinking. Law does not function as an independent variable in a complex
social equation, but constitutes some of the very fibres and sinews of
social life. It is not possible to think or act as a lawyer without taking
38. Apologies to Justice Holmes. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
39. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276
(1984).
40. See, e.g., L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
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a political stand or having a vision-no matter how unconscious or
crude-of the collective and individual possibilities for human
development.
The practical operation of the law is illustrative of how lawyers
(and laypeople) treat the law's conceptual apparatus and discursive
categories as natural, and how, in the process, they confer the status
of the real and concrete on the abstract and metaphorical. For
instance, when deciding whether a contract exists between two parties, lawyers speak and act as if they are looking for a "contractual
thing" in a drawer full of social events and circumstances. It is
assumed that, if all the facts are known, "the contract" will somehow
spring forth and bring the dispute to a demonstrable close. As all law
students know, however, a contract is an idea, not a thing; it is an
abstract construction within a socio-historical context. A contract
exists in the realm of metaphysics, not in the world of physicality; a
written contract is not the contract, but simply evidence of the
contract.
Similarly, property does not comprise the tangible objects in the
physical world, but the abstract relation between such visible effects
and people.4" Thus, although born of historical expediency and sustained by political convenience, legal categories, such as contract and
property, take on a life of their own and begin to paralyze the lawyers'
imagination. Unlike the life of the so-called natural world, social
activity responds to these conceptual metaphors and replicates itself
in approximate accordance with them. The life of law and lawyers is
not unaffected by prevailing ideas about what that life should or ought
to be. Not only does this give the law a patina of plausibility and
coherence, it also allows lawyers to refer to "reality" as confirmation
of the naturalness and inevitability of prevailing legal structures and
its underlying values. The fact that this process occurs unconsciously
makes it no less political. Indeed, it makes it much more effective.
Definitions of law and its component parts therefore are not referential facts, but political claims and ideological appropriations.42
V.

ON INDETERMINACY

Under the rubric "law is politics," the Critics take a very differ41. See Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 157 (1970) (property is "a sort of
vector analysis with time coordinates [of a bundle of forces]"); see also Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); and Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Conceptions As Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
42. For a more extensive discussion of this process, see Cohen & Hutchinson, Of Persons
and Property: The Politics of Legal Taxonomy, 14 DAHLHOUSIE L.J. (forthcoming, 1989).
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ent view of the epistemological status and methodological validity of
law's claim to determinacy. Legal doctrine does not conform to any
simple, internal rationality, nor is it reducible to a cluster of external
organizing principles. Although there is clearly an inseparable and
organic relation between law and politics, there is no single exposition
of that relation that is valid for all time and all societies. Any explanation is itself indeterminate; its character and implications vary with
the context.4 3 Although they may offer opinion and evaluation, they

do not make claims about whether doctrinal materials necessarily and
universally determine results, nor whether those results are necessarily and universally good or bad. They oppose any kind of functionalist or instrumentalist account of the relation between law and politics,
whether it comes from the right, left, or center of the political spectrum. Law is "neither a ruling-class game plan nor a repository of
noble if perverted principles ... [but] a plastic medium of discourse

that subtly conditions how we experience social life.""
With imagination and industry, legal materials can be organized
to support and justify incompatible outcomes. The fact that the general drift of these outcomes corresponds to the orientation of status
quo thinking and values is not determinative; indeed, it is not a matter
of doctrinal rationality, but simply a question of political orientation.
The socio-economic context is itself largely indeterminate and
requires no particular rule for its continued survival. Although a shift
in the whole regime of legal rules (e.g., contract and property) will be
significant, the existence or shading of particular rules (e.g., the postal
rules and the finders' rules) will not be crucial. Moreover, in the same
way that the socio-economic context underdetermines law, that very
same law overdetermines the possible outcomes to any legal dispute.
There is a general and pervasive indeterminacy that plagues all
attempts, not simply jurisprudential ones, to explain social events and
to fix social knowledge.
Even when there appears to be a consensus on the existence of
any particular rule, nothing necessarily flows from that concession.
Whether a rule exists and what it means are entirely different inquiries. Although they are not entirely unrelated, the issues give rise to a
different set of conceptual and normative concerns; a person's ability
to identify the French language is of little help in determining what
any particular example of it means. Rules do not operate as impersonal and dispositive forces in social conflicts. Their existence and
meaning are more often the consequences, as opposed to the causes, of
43. See Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L.
44. Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3(i)
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a particular resolution. Furthermore, even if there is a consensus on
the meaning and existence of a particular rule, either there is always
another rule that competes for application or the dispute can be
reclassified into another doctrinal field, such as from tort to property
or tort to contract. 45 Indeterminacy infiltrates all levels and dimensions of the law, energizing and debilitating the interpretive process
and the search for meaning.
The effort to identify one definitive and normative explanation of
that regime is defeated by the fact that a theory will not be able to
achieve the appropriate mix of analytical generality and historical
particularity. It runs the risk of overinclusion or underinclusion. A
theory that merely describes the extant details of legal practice will
not be able to predict the direction and nature of doctrinal change; it
will cease to be useful at the very time that its assistance is most
required-the identification and resolution of hard cases. On the
other hand, a theory that attempts to move beyond such detailed
description will run into two major obstacles. First, it will be unable
to account for a sufficient range of present legal data and thus lose its
descriptive power. Second, it will be compatible with various combinations of legal materials that comprise existing legal doctrine and fail
to deliver on its predictive promise. As Posner's efforts to justify a
theoretical account of responsible adjudication46 reveal, a solution to
this normative dilemma is agonizingly elusive.
Contrary to the traditional view of stability in the law, the law is,
in fact, a locus of conflict. There are a host of different interpretations
competing for descriptive and predictive superiority, but none is able
to claim final and absolute victory. Insofar as uncontested interpretation is only possible when there is a preexisting and shared set of
values, the competing and contradictory forces at work in forging a
legal doctrine foreclose the establishment of the necessary consensus.
Accordingly, legal doctrine is not a reflected embodiment of one
indwelling and sufficient theory; rather, it is the formal site for the
attempted, but unattainable blending and reconciliation of competing
theories. The temporary accommodations that are made are more the
result of political expediency than of moral purity. Although one theory may tend to dominate and infuse the law with its guiding principles, a competing theory will constantly challenge it and provide a
debilitating set of counterprinciples. At times, the tension will precipitate doctrinal crisis; while at other times, the friction will be subdued
and relatively untroubling. Whether muted or manifested, however,
45. See Cohen & Hutchinson, supra note 42, at 12-15.
46. See supra pp. 909-11.
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it fuels and informs doctrinal development. The particular trajectory
charted and followed, at least in part, will be a function of the larger
historical forces that impinge on the legal and judicial enterprise."'
Consequently, in this general sense, law is merely another arena for
the stylized struggle over the terms and conditions of social life. In
sum, law is politics.
VI.

THE TRADITIONAL RESPONSE

As the Critical position gains intellectual ground, a number of
misunderstandings drift (or push) into popular circulation. The most
persistent and pervasive of these misunderstandings of the Critics'
position are that law does not matter, that all cases can be decided
either way, that judges act out of purely subjective preference, and
that lawyers consciously manipulate doctrine. Although these misapprehensions are attributable to a whole range of prestigious sources,
they are nicely brought together in a short article by Alvin Rubin.4 8
By confronting them, I hope to clarify the claim that "law is politics"
and to strengthen the charge that the law is indeterminate.
A commonly expressed opinion is that the Critics are devoted to
the view that "doctrine means nothing."49 It is suggested that the
Critics maintain that legal doctrine is so fundamentally indeterminate
that it possesses hardly any meaning at all and has no magnetic pull
on the resolution of particular disputes. Each case is imagined to be
scribbled on a clean slate and can be decided in, at least two
incompatible ways. This version of the nonautonomist position is a
reductio ad absurdum, exaggerating the consequences of a rigorous
skepticism, ignoring the historical point of the critical inquiry, and
taking the political edge off the critique. It is definitely not the
47. This is not to downplay the importance of these forces or the need to explore their
precise operation. The focus of this paper, however, is on the doctrinal consequences of their
impact. For a general study of these wider issues, see J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE
JUDICIARY (3rd ed. 1987).
48. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the CriticalLegal Studies Movement,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1987). These sources include: S.BURTON, INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 188-93 (1985); Ackerman, Law, Economics and the Problem of Legal
Culture, [1986] DUKE L. J. 929 at 936-39; Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1205 (1985); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985);
Nelson, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies Between Robert W. Gordon and William
Nelson, 6 LAW & HIST. REv. 139, 157-68 (1988); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis.
Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 462 (1987); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986); Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence
and the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987); and Fiss, Law Proclaimed in THE
CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1985, 103 (F. McArdle ed. 1987).
49. Rubin, supra note 48, at 309. Owen Fiss forcefully and sophisticatedly posits this
opinion. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 740 (describing Critics as the new nihilists).
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nonautonomists' case that there can be no general consensus on the
shape and substance of past doctrine, nor that the resolution of particular cases cannot be confidently predicted. To ignore such facts is to
counsel a dangerous other-worldliness. It is the case, however, that
the law fails to meet its own proclaimed standards of rational justification and cognitive clarity. Law is indeterminate, but it is neither arbitrary nor entirely unpredictable. Unsupplemented by external
influences and values, legal doctrine can never by itself determine the
"correct" and "unique" answer to any particular dispute. Any fragile
consensus about meaning or any confidence in prediction does not
arise from within doctrine, but is given to doctrine from without.
Legal doctrine is not simply "out there." It is always in need of
collective retrieval and re-creation. The past is unknowable in and of
itself. The past has passed and was what it was, but it is up to those
that follow to decide what it will become: the future of the past is a
present and continuing responsibility. Tangled in a skein of fact and
fancy, history can never be excavated in its pristine immediacy.
Rather, it can only be experienced second hand. Consequently, meaning is always provisional because it is always open to reinterpretation,
and always conditional because it is only knowable from an interpretive perspective. Legal reality is the historical function of the ideological commitments that comprise a legal community at any given time,
a community whose identity and expression is itself an interpretive
artifact that is never "self-present as a positive fact." 50 Thus there
simply does not exist a necessary and adequate connection between
legal outcomes and doctrinal materials.
None of this is intended to deny the shared sense of doctrinal
intelligibility that everyone experiences at some time. Indeed, in the
theoretical interrogation of "shared meaning," there is an implicit and
unavoidable reliance on the practice of shared meaning.5" What it is
intended to do is to show that there can be no law without interpretation, no interpretation without judges, and no judges without politics.
The crux of the matter is not the existence of institutional meaning
and general predictability, but the source and authority of the normative reading offered or supposed. On what basis can one reading be
privileged over another? Legal doctrine need not be as it is; it always
contains the resources for its own reinterpretation and revisioning.
Doctrinal consistency and regularity are not attributable to law, but
50. See Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, recollective Imaginationand the Potential
for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1207 (1988); see also S.
FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Yablon, The Indeterminacy of Law: Critical

Legal Studies and the Problem of Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917 (1985).
51. See Derrida, Signature Event Context, 1 GLYPH 172 (1977).
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are attributable instead to the politics of lawyers. Although every
case could be decided doctrinally in contradictory ways, the relatively
homogeneous values of lawyers and judges ensure that some results
will be much more likely than others. The reconstructive potential of
the law can never be squeezed out by its present actuality; closure of
doctrinal openness is only bought at the price of intellectual self-delusion and philosophical puzzlement. Accordingly, the truth is that
doctrine is not nothing; it is a special kind of something. It means
nothing until it is interpreted, and although it will always have meaning, its meaning will be determined by those who interpret it.
A second misunderstanding, that flows from the first, is that, if
there is any validity to the Critics' claims, it only has force in cases
"which are unusual, indeed exceptional." 52 This argument relies on
the familiar distinction between easy and hard cases: although the
vast majority of cases will be straightforward and capable of disposition through the uncontroversial application of precedent, a small
minority of cases will raise novel or contested issues requiring a more
creative approach that goes beyond the mere application of precedent.
Thus there remains disagreement, even within the traditional ranks,
over the extent to which judges in hard cases are constrained by doc53
trine in its larger sense.
The easy/hard case distinction is more of a deferral of the autonomy issue than a definitive resolution of it. The difficulty centers on
the method by which such a distinction is to be made and on that
method's origin and normative status. In order to maintain intellectual credibility, that distinction must be defensible in terms of its
necessary and internal legal pedigree, and not as the creature of contingent and external political considerations. To do otherwise would
be to recognize that law is driven by politics and, as such, to deny the
autonomy of law from politics. This is exactly what reliance on the
easy/hard case distinction does. Moreover, this maneuver points out
a more general infirmity in the attempt to defend a law-politics separation. If law is valued because it is separable from politics, it can
only be because it is politically desirable to have such a separation.
The autonomy of law cannot be intrinsically valuable; it must be justified by reference to nonlegal values. In short, the law-politics distinction is thoroughly political in its character and ambition. 4
52. Rubin, supra note 48, at 309.
53. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 15, at 121-32; R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1979).

54. This argument is analogous to the critique of the substance/process distinction in
constitutional theory. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9-20 (1985).
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When analysis is pushed beyond the simple invocation of the
easy/hard case distinction, its political nature is plain. Within the
doctrinal and juristic materials, a hard case is one in which the application of precedent leads to a conclusion that is unacceptable because,
for example, it is out of step with conventional views of justice. This
means that the easy case is one in which the conclusion is acceptable.
It follows therefore that easy cases are not decided by purely doctrinal
promptings, but are merely couched in doctrinal language: it is the
prevailing ideas of "acceptability" that decide the case. Consequently, although it is true that most cases are easy, it is not because
existing rules dispose of them. It is because their disposition by the
rules is considered to be acceptable." In effect, then, all cases are
hard in the sense that they demand, no matter how unreflective or
taken-for-granted, an initial appeal to extra-doctrinal considerations
of acceptability. Easy cases are one kind of hard case, and any
defense of adjudicatory autonomy premised on their independence is
destined to fail.
The other common misunderstanding is that the Critics hold that
"decision-making is pure result-selection followed by rationaliza' This view posits that judges are consciously manipulative
tion."56
ideologues who combine, in Machiavellian manner, with their colleagues
to implement a clear and self-serving scheme of social injustice. To
associate the Critics with such a crude view of human decisionmaking
and motivation is to ignore their sophisticated articulation of the
operation of legal ideology. The ascription of such judgmental selfconsciousness to individual actors is a feature of the very political philosophy that the Critics are most at pains to discredit and dislodge.
The whole critical enterprise is devoted to abandoning the dichotomous view that law is either the reflection of pure reason or the exercise of pure power. Instead, it contends that reason and power are
inseparable and that each informs and provides the context for the
other.
To be plausible, any critical theory of adjudication must be able
to account for the constraints felt by judges. It cannot discard the
real experience that decisionmakers have of being compelled by doctrine to reach particular results. Nevertheless, this existential fact
does not require a denial of ideology. Its most important function is
to offer a framework for formulating a personal identity and selfunderstanding, including the idea that we are independent operatives
55. For a fuller account of this argument, see Hutchinson & Wakefield, A Hard Look at
'HardCases: The Nightmare of A Noble Dreamer,2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 86 (1982).
56. Rubin, supra note 48, at 312.
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in the social world. Indeed, legal consciousness operates so effectively
precisely because it persuades the "rulers" as well as the "ruled" that
the judicial function is a constrained and impersonal exercise of official authority. It is just as flawed to propose that the lawyer is everything as it is to suggest that the law is everything. Although there are
instances of overt manipulation, legal doctrine amounts to more than
the residual traces of the judicial mind's unconfined free-play. The
posited distinction between "that to be interpreted" (doctrine) and
"that which interprets" (lawyer) cannot be sustained." Neither doctrine nor lawyer exclusively controls meaning; each is implicated by
and in the other. Both doctrine and lawyer are shaped by their political milieu; they interact and interpenetrate to generate legal discourse
and its reality. Judgement and values are neither the objective
essences of an intelligible world nor the subjective fantasies of a chaotic existence. They are the contingent effect of varied and overlapping economies of intellectual, social, and political thought.
VII.

A MILLERS' TALE

The proof of any theoretical pudding is in the tasting. This is as
true for the Critics' position as it is for Posner's and the other traditionalists. The major argument that must be defended is that law is
different from politics in that the application of legal reasoning to particular problems makes an appreciable difference to the problem's resolution. If these cases are left to the ebb-and-flow of ideological
exchanges, the autonomists' argument must be that the outcome will
be different. Of course, it is not necessary to show that the result will
be different in every case, only that there will be a difference in a
statistically significant number of cases. Also, the autonomists must
be able to demonstrate that this difference is attributable to a reliance
upon legal reasoning, and not to the political preference of the legal
reasoner. In short, the law per se must make a difference.
For the traditional claim to pull any epistemological weight, its
proponents must show that law is a rational discipline, and not merely
a convenient battery of technical rationalizations. Doctrinal justification must be more than conventional apparel for naked political preference. Furthermore, the demonstration that any particular decision
is wrong or errant will not be sufficient to support their arguments.
Indeed, those who believe in law's determinacy presumably must
accept a difference between being a bad judge and not being a judge at
all. Rather than concentrating on identifying the criteria of legitimate
57. See Kennedy, Toward A Phenomenology of Adjudication, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan eds. 1987).
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legal reasoning, it more instructive to put the usual questions in a
slightly different way: What might not amount to a legal analysis of
the facts and the doctrinal matters in a particular dispute? And what
might not count as a judicial resolution of them?
In order to substantiate these criticisms, and to join substantive
issue with Posner and the conventionalists, I discuss the case of Miller
v. Jackson.58 This case deals with the vexing issue of "coming to the
nuisance"-whether it is a defense to an otherwise successful action in
nuisance that the offending state of affairs existed prior to, or at the
time of, the plaintiffs' acquisition of the land. Although it is generally
agreed that this is not a defense, there still thrives a vibrant debate
about its precise scope, application, and meaning. 59 After summarizing the facts, holding, and reasoning of that decision, I critique Posner's account of the rule and offer my own "critical" reading of the
judgments. My aim is not to show that there is no rule nor that there
is no better or worse result in specific circumstances. Instead, I aim to
establish that the doctrine does not by itself preclude or require any
particular outcome, and that no one result is uniquely preferable to
any other. Context and circumstance are crucial.
In Miller, the plaintiffs, the Millers, lived on a housing estate
which recently had been built by a cricket club on its grounds."°
Cricket had been played on the grounds for about seventy years. 6' As
a result of the Millers' complaints, the club erected a high fence to
prevent balls from invading the Millers' garden.62 This proved to be
no real defense, and according to the Millers, the situation became so
intolerable that they felt obliged to vacate their home whenever a
game was played.63 Finally, they sought an injunction to restrain the
playing of cricket. 64 The club contended that it had done everything
possible to prevent such occurrences: the fence was as high as wind
conditions allowed, and it had offered to install armored glass in the
58. 1977 Q.B. 966 (C.A.).
59. See Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch.D. 852 (1879) and Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34
N.W.2d 549 (1948). Some of the best of the academic literature includes Baxter & Altree,
Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1972); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward A
Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972); Elickson, Alternatives to Zoning, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in A System of Strict
Liability, J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); and Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
60. Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 968.
61. Id. at 969.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 970.
64. Id. at 969.
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Millers' house.6" The club denied, however, that its activities
amounted to an unreasonable interference with the Millers' enjoyment of their property. 66 Moreover, it insisted that it had taken all
reasonable measures to protect the Millers.67
Although the Millers were successful at first instance, the Court
of Appeal upheld their claim for damages, but refused to grant an
injunction against the playing of cricket. 68 The reasoning of the
judges is all over the doctrinal map. Lord Denning, M.R., concluded
that there was no negligence and no nuisance, but agreed that the club
should pay the Millers $800 for past and future damages. 69 At the
other extreme, Geoffrey Lane, L.J., held that there was both negligence and nuisance, and that an injunction should be granted, but as a
consoling gesture to the club, he postponed its issuance for twelve
months in order to allow for the location of a new ground.7 0 Finally,
Cumming-Bruce, L.J., who occupied a middle position, concluded
that there was both negligence and nuisance, but refused to grant an
injunction and only awarded damages of $800.71 Accordingly,
although the Millers won their action and recovered $800 in damages,
cricket was still played and balls continued to pepper their garden.
The fact that the judges' reasoning and conclusions are so evidently at odds with one another confirms little, but it does offer a rich
set of textual materials with which to work. Although some might
want to criticize a particular judgment as unsound or impolitic, it is
difficult to suggest that any of the three judgments does not amount to
legal reasoning or cannot be justified in terms of the existing doctrinal
materials. Legitimacy or validity is not the issue; the issue is one of
wisdom and cogency. Although each judgment can claim to be a
plausible performance of the judicial craft, each renders somewhat
transparent the assertion that law is a constrained mode of decisionmaking. Of course, it could be contended that, if one of the judges
explicitly and exclusively had decided the case on the basis that the
playing of cricket should be promoted ahead of all other activity, he
would not be acting judicially. Instead, he would be deciding in line
with his own personal values and preferences.7 2 At best, however,
65. Id. at 970, 977.
66. Id. at 972.
67. Id. at 971.

68. Id. at 989.
69. Id. at 982.
70. Id. at 987.
71. Id. at 989.
72. See supra pp. 548-49. It does not take a cynical or even close reading between the lines
to speculate that Denning's judgment might well be an example of such a cricket-loving
rationalization. See Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 976-82.
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this merely shows that a decision that is not couched in the language
of the law does not deserve the label "legal." This is neither a particularly devastating charge nor an interesting revelation. For it to be so,
it has to be demonstrated that the decision is not motivated by "nonlegal" considerations and then framed in the conventional rhetoric of
legal argumentation. It surely is the case that demagogues do not
become democrats because they dress the same. Rationalization is
not reasoning.
The Critics clearly would be wrong if they argued that it is not
the generally stated rule that "coming to the nuisance is no defense to
nuisance." This, however, does not dispense with the indeterminacy
claim. Rather, it simply offers a site at which to locate and begin the
deconstructive excavation. Indeed, Posner's discussion of the rule
and his implicit acceptance of its uncontroversiality establish the
ground for such an opportunity. Although it is easy to state the existence of the rule, it is much more difficult to explain its meaning and
scope. Posner's own illustrations of the problems associated with
applying the rule in different factual situations undermine, rather than
reinforce, his autonomist commitments. He provides clear confirmation of the Critics' major claims: that there is a large gap between a
general rule and particular result, that the gap can only be filled with
extra-legal considerations, and that these considerations will be the
determinative factor in any decision. All in all, his arguments give
modern emphasis to the traditional sentiment
that the law of nuisance
'73
"is immersed in undefined uncertainty.
Posner approves of the "no defence" rule not simply because it is
the law, but because it is defensible as a matter of sound economic
policy. When interpreted as placing liability on the party who can
avoid competing resource uses at the least cost, it enhances the maximization of wealth by ensuring that patterns of resource use are not
"frozen," and that the possibility of changing use is reflected in the
investment decisions of land developers. 74 Nevertheless, Posner cautions that "rejecting 'coming to the nuisance' is the efficient rule
provided costs are calculated on the correct ex ante basis."' 75 For
example, when a long-established polluting factory is gradually
engulfed by encroaching suburban developments, the relevant balancing is not between the relative moving costs of the factory and the
suburbanites; it is between the moving costs of the factory and the
cost at which the suburbanites could initially locate elsewhere.
73. Brand v. Hammersmith Ry., 1867 L.R.-Q.B. 233, 247 (Ex. Ch.) (Erle, C.J.).
74. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER supra note 21, at 50.
75. Id. at 51.
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Of course, the outcome of this balancing depends upon the particular costs in each case. In the example that Posner uses, as the
factory's costs are less than the suburbanites', the result is that there is
no nuisance and, consequently, that the factory can continue its operation (and pollution). This means that, in these particular circumstances, "coming to the nuisance" is a very real and effective defense
that is in flat contradiction to Posner's support of the common law's
rejection of the defense. Posner compounds this dissemblance in his
discussion of the familiar case of Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development, Co. 6 In Spur Industries, the court held the that
defendant's activities constituted a nuisance, but rather than issuing
an injunction against the defendant, or ordering him to pay damages
to the plaintiff, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's
moving costs. 77 Posner supports this "ingenious" decision on the
basis that it "creates an incentive for the party coming second ...to

go elsewhere instead if its costs of locating elsewhere, prior to its
locating next to the nuisance, would be lower than the cost to the
defendant of moving. '78 This is an express negation of the common
law rule and a demonstration of its indeterminacy, not an account of
its determinate explication and application.
Nevertheless, although Posner manages to reject the general rule
in the course of his professed support for it, it could be contended that
the economic rule of "least cost-avoider" is sufficiently determinate to
deflect such criticisms. This response fails for at least two reasons.
First, the deeper and more ideological difficulty is that any calculation
of allocative efficiency is always dependent upon contestable and
therefore indeterminate assumptions about the prior distribution of
resources. The value of any particular resource is inextricably and
complexly linked to whether or not a person already possesses it and
what other resources they might already possess.79 Second, the "least

cost-avoider" rule is open to exactly the same objections as the "no
defence" rule. The major stumbling block is the notorious difficulty
of isolating and quantifying the relevant costs with the necessary
degree of confidence and precision. Not only will much depend on
the level of transaction costs, but the respective costs of the parties are
76. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
77. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 184-86, 494
P.2d 700, 706-08 (1972). For an acknowledgement that this decision is inconsistent with the
common law rule, see Prichard, An Economic Analysis of Miller v. Jackson, in THE
CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1985, 71 (F. McArdle ed. 1987).
78. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 51.
79. See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50 (1987); Baker, The
Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); Kennedy, CostBenefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
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so detailed and so interdependent that their calculation is always speculative and hypothetical. For example, who are the relevant parties?
Are they the plaintiff, the suburbanites at large, or the developer?
What amounts to a cost? Who or what decides cost in a particular
case? When is valuation to occur? In short, general theoretical plausibility is confounded by specific factual malleability. As Posner himself has remarked, "the exactness which economic analysis rigorously
pursued appears to offer is, at least in the litigation setting, somewhat
delusive."80
All of these observations of Posner's analysis can be brought
together in considering his likely response to the Miller case. By his
lights, anything is possible and all bets are on. The looseness of his
"least cost-avoider" interpretation guarantees that any outcome can
be justified and supported-the continuance of cricket, the continuance of cricket with payment of damages, the prohibition of cricket,
and the prohibition of cricket with compensation for relocation. The
crunch question is which costs are to be included in the social
calculus. It is surely the case that the economic variables can be
selected and quantified to ensure very different computations of the
economically optimal result. Indeed, more to the point, there is no
technical or objective manner in which to assign or formulate such
costs. Some values will be overlooked, while others will receive disproportionate attention. 8 Is it the costs of the Millers that are to be
tabulated? Is it the accumulated costs of all the neighboring landowners? Or, instead, is it the initial relocation costs of the developer of
the residential estate that should be assessed? What about those
neighbors who view the proximity of the cricket club as a benefit? Is
the valuation to be based on general market prices? Or, rather, is it
the Millers' idiosyncratic costing that should prevail? Do the club's
costs include the inconvenience to the players, spectators, and their
opponents? How is such disappointment to be quantified? Is tradition or local culture to count at all?
Once the "appropriate" costing and calculation is completed,
Posner presumably would write the decision in his favored style of
judicial reasoning. Moreover, whatever outcome he arrives at, the
decision will simply be a card to be played in the continuing game of
bargaining and behavior modification; the law will not be the arbiter
of the dispute, but will only be a factor in the workings of the market.
In theory, for example, the club could "buy out" any injunction
awarded to the Millers, or the Millers could "bribe" the club to con80. See O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1982).
81. See A. SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 29-57 (1988).
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tinue their cricket elsewhere. This raises another thorny problem of
valuation, namely, wealth effects: is the relevant figure the amount
the Millers would be willing to pay to the club to stop the cricket, or
is it the amount the Millers would be willing to accept from the club
to permit the cricket? In answering these riddles, the so-called traditional virtues of doctrinal predictability, determinacy, and integrity
are ransomed to the cause of a spurious and crude political instrumentalism. The law becomes the agent of the market rather than its
principal, and legal theory becomes the tool of the marketeer.
VIII.

A DECONSTRUCTIVE RETELLING
This critique of Posner can be generalized and tied to a broader
theory of legal interpretation, known as deconstruction. 82 Although
it has come to be used as a general catch-all for any unconventional
criticism of law and legal theory, it is a very subversive and profound
form of philosophical critique. Its target is the whole edifice of Western metaphysics. Its practitioners do not want to eject its present
incumbents and occupy the building themselves; they seek to demolish it so that no one can live within it. In jurisprudential terms, the
ambition is to show that law and legal doctrine are not and cannot be
informed by an overarching "rationality." It is not that legal doctrine
is irrational, nonrational, or meaningless, nor is it any more or less
rational than any other mode of thought or reasoning. 3 On the contrary, deconstruction shows that law is "of a piece" with other forms
of social knowledge. There is no Rationality, but there are many
rationalities, and each is as historically conditioned, politically specific, and socially constructed as the other.
Deconstruction is not a philosophy, but is, instead, a theoretical
strategy for displacing traditional philosophy, especially its insistence
upon the existence of a stable foundation for "truth" and "knowledge." For the deconstructionist, however, referentiality and meaning are not so much nonexistent as profoundly problematic. The
attempt to demonstrate and defend any theory of embodied meaning
is ruthlessly revealed as leading into a black hole of historical deferment. No interpretation is right or wrong, and no mode of linguistic
signification can achieve interpretive hegemony. Deconstruction does
82. For an extended introduction to deconstruction as a mode of legal critique, see
Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 34-41. For a more technical and less radical account, see
Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
83. Irrationalists, like Paul Feyeraband, remain trapped within the very system they
criticise and claim to reject. See P. FEYERABAND, AGAINST METHOD (1975). A studied

irrationality in which "anything goes" is the mirror image of the opposed Rationality and is
guilty of the same reductionist and totalizing tendency.
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not erase meaning or deny intentionality. Rather, it perpetually
postpones and de-centers them, depriving them of any privileged or
original authority. It foils any orderly attempt to achieve progress or
knowledge, or simply to recover meaning by denying that there ever
can be philosophical closure to the vertiginous attempts at historical
appropriation. Nonetheless, deconstruction is not randomly or wantonly destructive. It takes the subject of its critique and, working to
collapse it from within, deconstructs the constructs of its philosophy
to better reveal their "constructedness."
In order to understand and control the world, traditional thinking employs a set of enabling distinctions that are treated as natural
and obvious, distinctions such as objective/subjective, reason/emotion, or mind/body. This means that any coherent and cogent
account of fixed meaning and grounded knowledge must not only
explain the precise and stable relationship between these oppositions,
but also find a way of talking about them that is itself precise and
stable. Traditional thinking claims to accomplish this by privileging
one account over the other, and by granting it epistemological authority. In contrast, deconstruction goes behind these hierarchical dichotomies and shows that they have a history, and that they are far from
natural or obvious. Operating from inside the traditional paradigm,
deconstruction unravels and lays bare the contradictory, inescapable,
and warring forces that both constitute and confound the common
sense meaning of words and texts. A good example of this is the historically constructed and contested distinction of male/female that is
used to justify a whole set of conceptual and social practices.
Moreover, these duplicitous dualities of consciousness cannot be
sustained. The unprivileged "other" disrupts and undermines its
privileged partner. Although it is a necessary contrast to it, it is also a
contradiction of it. So interrelated are each to the other that the one
not only makes the other possible, but contributes to its negation:
"Neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either or."'8 4 In short, what is
excluded is implicated in, and essential to, what is included: philosophy depends on the very history that it is at pains to deny. The metaphysical dream of providing a solid foundation for "Truth" and
"Knowledge" is doomed to failure by its own lights. More important,
however, the deconstructive technique is not intended simply to
reverse the hierarchical order and place, for instance, community over
individual or woman over man in terms of epistemological authority.
It is to be understood as rejecting entirely the dichotomous and pas84. J.

DERRIDA, POSITIONS

43 (A. Bass trans. 1981).
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sive mode of thinking about the world in favor of a more engaged and
active way of truth-making.
The three judgments in Miller offer a rich textual diet on which
the hungry deconstructionist can feast."5 In particular, Denning's
judgment is an opportunity par excellence for the deconstructionists
to show their analytical stuff. It is a textbook example of the
"flipability" of supposedly opposite categorizations and the arbitrary
prioritization of one term over the other. The deconstructive challenge is to describe the process by which this occurs and the interests
that it serves. As such, the critique is a simple laying bare of contradiction's insidious existence at the heart of doctrinal being. Denning's
efforts to negotiate the public/private distinction set the stage perfectly for such a description:
[I]t is our task to balance the right of the cricket club to continue
playing cricket ... as against the right of the householder not to be
interfered with .... There is a contest here between the interest of
the public at large and the interest of a private individual. The
public interest lies in protecting the environment by preserving our
playing fields in the face of mounting development, and by
enabling our youth to enjoy all the benefits of outdoor games, such
as cricket and football. The private interest lies in securing the
privacy of his home and garden without intrusion or interference
by anyone .... As between their conflicting interests, I am of the
opinion 86
that the public interest should prevail over the private
interest.
It takes little imagination to realize that Denning's pouring of
social wine into the conceptual bottles of public and private interests
can be of a very different kind. The playing of cricket can be as "private" a matter as sitting out in the sun, and the security of people's
homes can be as "public" a matter as the preservation of playing
fields. Although the "flipability" of Denning's characterization is
plain and simple in Miller, it is possible to make such a switch in any
situation. In short, the raw materials of life do not present themselves
to policymakers immutably divided into natural categories of social
interest. The world is not a given; it is constantly being made and
85. In writing the remainder of this section, I benefitted enormously from a lecture and
unpublished paper by Frank Michelman. See Michelman, Miller v. Jackson En Critique (Nov.
1985) [hereinafter Michelman, En Critique] (on file at the University of Miami Law Review).
86. Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 981-82. Geoffrey Lane makes passing reference to the need to
balance public and private interests and seems to favour private over public. See id. at 986.
For an extended critique of the public/private distinction, see Hutchinson, Mice Under a
Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming,
1989); Hutchinson & Petter, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of The
Charter,38 U. TORONTO L.J. 278 (1988).
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remade. Seeds of fact reap a rich harvest of values only when cultivated by ideological gardeners. Denning's depiction of the contestants is a prescriptive act of creation, rather than a descriptive report
of detachment.
Having established the competing interests and assigned the litigants to their respective sides of the balancing scales, Denning then
proceeds to place his thumb on the side of public interest. In such
public/private contests, he seems to assume that it is axiomatic that
"the public interest should prevail over the private interest." 87 The
whole judgment is given over to establishing a rhetorical climate in
which the prevalence of the public interest seems obvious and natural.
Denning, however, offers no reason as to why this conclusion should
be treated as self-evident. Indeed, he begs the very question that his
analysis is supposedly directed towards answering-when and why
does the public interest prevail over private interest? When it comes
to the decisional crunch, the Master of the Rolls hides behind declaratory platitudes-"[o]n taking the balance, I would .. ,"' and "[a]s
between their conflicting interests, I am of the opinion ...
eliding any explanatory reasoning. His judgment draws its appeal and
cogency, if any, from his efforts to tap the political sensibilities and
sympathies of his intended audience, rather than from the logical
rigor of its doctrinal analysis.
The style and phrasing of Denning's offering is structured by the
contradictory impulses of "progress" and "tradition." Although his
judgment is voiced predominantly in the accent of a progressive preference for calculations of public interest in matters of competing landuse, there is a more subtle idiom of traditional rhetoric that runs
alongside and is often intertwined with the more dominant tone. At
the same time that he refuses "to approach this case with the eyes of
the judges of the 19th century" 90 and insists that "it should be
approached on principles applicable to modem conditions,"' he is
adamant that temporal priority is deserving of legal precedence. 92 He
frequently and pejoratively contrasts the cricket club's long-standing
contribution to the community with the Millers' status as "newcomers." 93 In this consummate exercise in judicial craft, Denning manages to couch a defense of vested property rights in the language of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 982.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 981-82.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 981.
Id.
Id. at 976 -81.
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social progress. For all of his rhetorical support of progress and public interest, the driving force behind the decision is the conservative
desire to preserve the status quo: "I would agree [with Lord Reid's
dictum that '[i]f cricket cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played there at all'] if the
houses or road was there first, and the cricket ground came there second." 94 Of course, to reach the same result, Denning could have run
a more straightforward traditional defense of vested interests, but this
would have robbed the decision of much of its success as a rhetorical
exemplar.
Cumming-Bruce and Geoffrey Lane take a tack different from
Denning's, but still manage to ground themselves on the shoals of
contradiction. The particular dilemma that they perceive, and from
which they seek to escape, is that between precedent and equity or, in
grander terms, between positive law and natural law. It is a manifestation of the tension between the desire for stability and certainty and
the simultaneous urge for flexibility and maneuverability. At the
heart of this dilemma is the acceptance that justice demands, as an
institutional matter, both the general embrace of rule-driven adjudication and the occasional departure from it, i.e., "the rules transcend
the case as immediately experienced, the insight is immanent in it." 95
The challenge for judges therefore is to decide in which particular
circumstances the general rules are either to be observed or to be
overlooked. The traditional response by which to contain and mediate this contradiction has been the regular, but unconvincing, resort
to "discretion."
For both Cumming-Bruce and Geoffrey Lane, their personal
sympathies lay with the cricket club, whose officials they found to be
"candid and forthright, '96 rather than with Mrs. Miller, whom they
thought verged on the "neurotic" and "obsessive." 97 They both
agreed, however, that existing doctrine seemed to mandate a result in
the Millers' favor. 98 This presented them with the classic contest
between the pull of precedent and the lure of justice. Geoffrey Lane
opted to follow the rules laid down. 99 In doing this, however, he did
not act against justice, but in the name of justice."° He collapsed the
94. Id. at 977 (quoting Bolton v. Stone, 1951 A.C. 850, 867 (Lord Reid)).

95. Michelman, En Critique, supra note 85, at 5.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 984.
Id. at 983-89.
Id. at 987 (Geoffrey, Lane, L.J.); id (Cumming-Bruce, L.J.).
Id. at 986.
Id. at 986-87.
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distinction between law and equity by assuming that justice required
strict obedience to the results of rule-application:
Precedent apart, justice would seem to demand that the plaintiffs
should be left to make the most of the site they have elected to
occupy with all its obvious advantages and equally obvious disadvantages ....If the matter were res integra, I confess I should be
inclined to find for the defendants .... Unfortunately, however,
the question is not open ....It may be that [the rule in Sturges v.
Bridgman] works injustice, it may be that one would decide the
matter differently in the absence of authority. But we are bound by
[that] decision ... and it is not for this court as I see it to alter a
rule which has stood for so long.101
Whereas Geoffrey Lane arbitrarily conflated law and equity,
Cumming-Bruce arbitrarily separated them.'0 2 He sought to demonstrate that discretion can be used to temper the rule without swallowing it; it is a matter of equity being ordered by the law, and discretion
being required by the rules. Although justice requires that rules be
followed, the rules also sanction the resort to discretion. 10 3 Thus his
opinion was an implicit attempt to instruct Geoffrey Lane in the possibilities of legal doctrine and judicial craft. Agreeing with Geoffrey
Lane on "his reasoning and conclusion upon the liability of the
defendants,"'" Cumming-Bruce relied upon the distinction between
liability and remedy to escape the dilemma of contradiction:
There is authority that, in considering whether to exercise a judicial discretion to grant an injunction, the court is under a duty to
consider the interests of the public ....So on the facts of this case
a court of equity must seek to strike a fair balance between the
right of the plaintiffs to have quiet enjoyment of their house...
and the opportunity of the inhabitants of the village.., to enjoy
...a summer recreation ....It is a relevant circumstance which a
court of equity should take into account that the plaintiffs decided
to buy a house which.., was obviously on the boundary of a quite
small cricket ground .... There are here special circumstances
which should inhibit a court of equity from granting the injunction
05

claimed. 1

This deconstructive reading of Miller hopefully has shown that
legal doctrine is another combat zone over the terms and arrangements of social life. With varying degrees of sophistication, the three
judges engaged in a rhetorical exercise that was intended to persuade
101. Id.
102. Id. at 988-89.
103. Id. at 988.

104. Id. at 987.
105. Id. at 988-89.
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both others and themselves that law is autonomous from the openended encounters of overt, ideological confrontation. In contrast, the
responsibility of the critic is to counteract these attempts to de-politicize and de-historicize the judicial development of doctrine. By reinstalling politics and history into the legal enterprise, people may come
to see that the determination of legal meaning involves an inevitable
taking of sides. Law is neither separate nor separable from disputes
concerning the kind of world there is and can be. Law is the historical residue of one kind of political struggle.
IX.

DEMOCRACY AND DETERMINACY

Nietzsche's apocalyptic announcement that "God is dead"
echoed a truth that had been long grasped by most lawyers. The
belief that law represented God's design never held much sway. It
was conceded that law was a human artifact, and that it could never
amount to much more (and was often much less) than a flawed distillation of divine wisdom. Despite this traditional acknowledgement,
and modem protestations to the contrary, the enclaves of law remain
"caves, for ages yet, in which His shadow will be shown." 10 6 Instead
of dwelling on God's loss, jurists must rest content with "voicing the
dictates of a vague divinity";17 these pseudo-theological musings usually come veiled in the trappings of philosophy and economics.
Although lawyerliness may no longer be next to godliness, dreams of
hubris still fire the jurisprudential imagination. Abstract reflection is
given priority over experiential engagement, and detached reason
remains the touchstone for valid knowledge about ourselves, our situation, and the legal order. In the struggle for social justice, philosophy and science are preferred to democracy. As law is cast as an
exercise in reason, lawyers are fated to become philosophers or social
scientists, if law is to perfect itself and operate as a guide for the
anguished democrat.
Even with a recognition that reason and power are connected,
however, this self-image of the lawyer or legal theorist as a trader in
eternal verities must be abandoned. As the high priest of law-andeconomics, Posner and his flock must be defrocked. Indeed, this
whole theoretical endeavor will have to undergo a radical reappraisal
and reorientation. The philosophy of law must cease to be a task of
106. 3 F. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 108 (2 ed. 1887).
107. Hand, supra note 4, at 361. Even the most pragmatic of constitutional commentators
affirm "repeated acts of faith" that law "has both boundaries and moral significance not wholly
reducible to, although never independent of, the ends for which it is deployed." See L. TRIBE,
supra note 54, at 4.
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refined description and defined prescription; it must become a political project of deconstruction and reconstruction. The whole agenda
of questions to be answered-What is law, and how is it different from
politics?-is in need of redrafting. Loaded questions engender loaded
answers; these particular questions assume that law is indeed different, and that the jurist's primary task is to explain how it is different.
Archibald MacLeish had the measure of contemporary scholarship:
"[w]e have learned the answers, all the answers; it is the question that
we do not know."1 °8 The answers that Posner and the autonomists
propose cannot be rejected out-of-hand. But they can be stripped of
their false objectivity and treated as one more in a series of proposals
to be debated and considered in the popular assemblies of democratic
politics.
To traffic in philosophical disillusionment is not to indulge in a
cheerless cynicism; it is neither nihilistic nor irresponsible. By
encouraging people to understand themselves as the makers of decisions and not as the amanuenses of a received wisdom, they will begin
to assume greater responsibility for the consequences of those decisions, and the ensuing society will become truly theirs. In this way,
people will grasp that democracy is not about servitude either to philosophical tyrants, interpretive Popes, or legal emperors. 109 Instead, it
is about personal participation and social solidarity. In a world of
incorrigible indeterminacy, the sane response is neither despair nor
defeat. It is the bold acceptance that decisionmaking is no more mysterious and no less complex than the rest of life. People must think,
decide, and act in the same way in law as they aspire to do in the rest
of their lives-through concrete and constitutive engagements in
which the participants converse and act in a shared commitment to
mutual enlightenment and continuing respect for the engagement's
own ethical dynamic. 10 This recognition and aspiration will mean
that democratic practice will have to be given priority over legalistic
values. The devaluation of the Rule of Law, in a society in which it
has come to signify rule by lawyers, is not an occasion to be lamented.
Within democratic communities, intelligible action is not an
extended genuflection to the revealed truth of "Reason" or "Economic Efficiency." It is a situated act of constructive cooperation
among ourselves. In all matters, decisionmaking will be more than
108. A. MACLEISH, The Hamlet ofA. MacLeish, in COLLECTED POEMS, 1917-1982 (1985).
109. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 407 (philosophers and emperors); Fiss, supra note 2,
at 755 (interpretive Popes).
110. See Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life: From Liberal Chatter to Democratic
Conversation in LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? (A. Hutchinson and
L. Green eds. 1989).
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"the deliverance of a Reason so immanent that its own name is the
only explanatory word it can utter."' There will be a general sensitivity to the fact that rationality is less a guide or a limiting condition
for individual action, and more an achievement and elaboration of
social engagement. Within such an enlightened context, indeterminacy will not engender efforts to gloss over or theorize it away. It will
be attended to in a spirit of collective humility. Eschewing the need
for relief or escape from taking responsibility for life's always difficult
and often painful decisions, there is a sustaining satisfaction in people
facing and resolving these decisions by themselves. Although it will
be no less heated and contested, public policymaking can become a
treasured creation of people's own craft, and not the glossy product of
legal chicanery. The appropriation of political discourse by a legal
elite offends and inhibits the aspiration to progressive or egalitarian
governance. In short, social justice will be brought about in spite of,
not because of, lawyers.
In Miller, although all three judges mentioned it in passing, there
was an overlooked democratic solution to the problem. An informed
and electorally accountable body had already considered the issue.
Lord Denning mentioned the matter of planning approval, but only to
dismiss it as misguided:
I must say that I am surprised that the developers of that housing
estate were allowed to build the houses so close to the cricket
ground. No doubt they wanted to make the most of their site and
put up as many houses as they could for their own profit. The
planning authorities ought not to have allowed it. The houses
ought to have been so sited as not to interfere with the cricket. But
the houses have been built and we have to contend with the consequences ....

[The cricket club] ha[s] spent money, labour and

love in the making of [the cricket ground]; and they have the right
to play on it as they have done for seventy years. Is this all to be
rendered useless to them by the thoughtless and selfish act of an
estate developer in building right up to the edge of it?" 2
Without speaking to the procedural niceties or substantive merits, it can be assumed that the development was neither entirely
"thoughtless" nor "selfish." Before the developers could proceed,
they had to obtain planning permission. This would have had to be
granted in accordance with established regulations, formulated policies, and required procedures. By ignoring this fact, the court substituted its own decision for that of the planning authorities. Moreover,
111. Michelman, En Critique, supra note 85, at 14. See also J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR

213 (1929).
112. See Miller, 1977 Q.B. at 976, 978.
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it did so without troubling itself with either the details or reasoning of
the planning authorities. The point, however, is not who made the
"correct" or "right" decision; it is which is the most appropriate
body, in terms of institutional competence and democratic legitimacy,
to do the necessary balancing and compromising of competing interests. On both counts, a "less-than-ideal" municipal board is preferable to an "ideal-as-possible" judicial bench.
In a democratic society, law is another institutional site where
the same contradictory impulses that constitute and challenge our
individual selves can be openly addressed. In addition, as in our personal lives, any accommodation achieved in the response to indeterminacy must be self-conscious, tentative, and revisable. No signposts
on life's journey will be found that are not of our own making. The
realization might dawn that it is only possible to illuminate the way
into the historical dark of the future by the clarity of our joint commitment and engagement. Rather than sight and pursue an imaginary light at the end of the historical tunnel-it will only be some
philosopher's torch or economist's lantern-we therefore must look
to each other. There is no shirking that responsibility; domination
and thraldom are all that can be hoped for when it is believed that
theological relief is at hand. The transcendental search will have to
yield to a quest for greater participation and democracy.
In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that it is not so much that
we can never know the singer from the song, but that we will always
know "Law's Song" by its legal singers. Law is little more than the
accumulated babble of lawyers' voices, a discordant overture in the
key of established interests. If people are to make good on their democratic ambitions, they must resist the siren-song of the Law and its
seductive, but ignoble, hymn to the status quo. Democracy is a lasting celebration of each person's musicality, and a joyful occasion to
dance and sing to unheard melodies of life's possibilities. By obliging
citizens to listen and move to legal tunes not of their own making, nor
of their own wanting, they will remain "idle singer[s] of an empty
day"'1 3 and dancers of a heavy step.
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